The World Model
Behavioural forecasts of the ASI transition — built from what 97 registry stakeholders have actually done since 2015, not what they've said.
Objective & methodology
Objective: predict how the world develops as AI progresses toward ASI, by modelling the key stakeholders who steer it.
- Behavioural profiles. Built from each stakeholder's historical actions, 2015 to present — never their statements. Say-do gaps (what they claimed vs what they did) are treated as signal, not noise.
- Incentives layer. What each actor actually optimizes for, revealed by what they sacrificed to get it — plus who they answer to and what pressures they operate under.
- Relative power, six dimensions. Capital, compute, authority, chokepoint control, attention, talent — each scored and time-varying, not static.
- Reaction functions. Falsifiable trigger → response patterns derived from behaviour × incentives × power, including interactions between stakeholders (typed influence edges, consequence-chaining downstream of a predicted move).
- Walk-forward validation. The engine predicted each year 2021 through H1-2026 from strictly truncated data, was scored against what actually happened, and rewrote its own rules after every window — 39 forward-only rule changes so far.
- The honesty note. Walk-forward backtest: profiles truncated to each cutoff, predictions frozen before scoring, rule changes apply forward only. The predictor model was trained on post-2020 data, so pooled scores measure method consistency and calibration, NOT out-of-sample foresight. The only true out-of-sample test is the live forward ledger from 2026H2 onward.
Track record
Five pooled walk-forward windows (2021-2025): each year predicted from data strictly truncated to the prior year, scored against what actually happened.
| Window | Hit rate | Brier | Coverage | Directional acc. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 87.2% | 0.141 | 62.2% | — |
| 2022 | 92.5% | 0.110 | 77.0% | 96.0% |
| 2023 | 95.6% | 0.108 | 77.0% | 99.0% |
| 2024 | 94.4% | 0.069 | 79.0% | 97.0% |
| 2025 | 95.8% | 0.039 | 81.2% | 99.0% |
Walk-forward backtest: profiles truncated to each cutoff, predictions frozen before scoring, rule changes apply forward only. The predictor model was trained on post-2020 data, so pooled scores measure method consistency and calibration, NOT out-of-sample foresight. The only true out-of-sample test is the live forward ledger from 2026H2 onward.
The Registry — 97 nodes, 83 profiled
Every scored stakeholder, one row each — including the five pilots this model started with (US President, Chinese party-state, Altman/OpenAI, Jensen/Nvidia, salaried knowledge workers), now first-class rows among the full set. Click a row for its incentives, reaction functions, edges, and recent logged actions. By class: sovereign-political 14 · ai-compute 14 · sector 12 · population 12 · watchlist-domain 9 · infrastructure-chokepoint 8 · meaning-adversarial 8 · governance-rules 6 · field 5 · capital 4 · states-blocs 4 · robotics 1
| Name | Tier | Types | Capital | Compute | Authority | Chokepoint | Attention | Talent | Composite ▾ | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ▸Chinese party-state | 1 | decision | 92 | 45 | 97 | 88 | 60 | 72 | 77.1 | ↑ |
| ▸Alphabet | 1 | decision | 98 | 92 | 42 | 70 | 78 | 85 | 75.2 | ↑ |
| ▸TSMC | 1 | chokepoint, decision | 80 | 88 | 55 | 96 | 55 | 78 | 75.2 | ↑ |
| ▸Zuckerberg — Meta | 1 | decision | 93 | 82 | 44 | 66 | 85 | 83 | 72.5 | ↑ |
| ▸Jensen Huang — Nvidia | 1 | decision, chokepoint | 92 | 75 | 32 | 95 | 88 | 80 | 72.1 | ↑ |
| ▸Sam Altman — OpenAI | 1 | decision | 85 | 88 | 38 | 62 | 92 | 84 | 71.1 | ↑ |
| ▸US President | 1 | decision | 82 | 12 | 100 | 90 | 96 | 55 | 71.0 | ↑ |
| ▸Microsoft | 1 | decision | 96 | 85 | 40 | 62 | 72 | 78 | 70.3 | ↑ |
| ▸Musk complex | 1 | decision | 86 | 72 | 52 | 60 | 90 | 78 | 70.1 | ↑ |
| ▸Amazon/AWS | 1 | decision | 95 | 84 | 38 | 66 | 45 | 76 | 67.1 | ↑ |
| ▸US natsec + export-control state | 1 | decision | 62 | 12 | 90 | 96 | 60 | 62 | 62.9 | ↑ |
| ▸Dario Amodei — Anthropic | 1 | decision | 76 | 78 | 30 | 58 | 72 | 82 | 62.4 | ↑ |
| ▸Saudi Arabia — MBS | 1 | decision | 88 | 42 | 80 | 60 | 55 | 25 | 62.1 | ↑ |
| ▸UAE — Tahnoun/MGX/G42 | 1 | decision | 90 | 48 | 78 | 42 | 45 | 30 | 60.1 | ↑ |
| ▸US Federal Reserve | 1 | decision, frame | 70 | 12 | 78 | 70 | 80 | 55 | 58.7 | ↓ |
| ▸Samsung+SK Hynix | 2 | chokepoint, decision | 75 | 60 | 35 | 82 | 40 | 68 | 58.5 | ↑ |
| ▸South Korea | 1 | chokepoint, decision | 70 | 45 | 55 | 72 | 40 | 65 | 57.5 | ↑ |
| ▸Defense | 2 | decision, flow | 72 | 40 | 60 | 55 | 55 | 60 | 56.5 | ↑ |
| ▸Taiwan | 1 | chokepoint, decision | 66 | 30 | 50 | 78 | 55 | 70 | 55.2 | ↑ |
| ▸EU (Commission) | 1 | decision, frame | 75 | 25 | 74 | 55 | 45 | 45 | 54.8 | ↑ |
| ▸ByteDance | 1 | decision | 70 | 42 | 35 | 62 | 88 | 60 | 54.7 | ↑ |
| ▸Oracle/Stargate consortium | 2 | decision | 78 | 70 | 35 | 55 | 60 | 20 | 54.4 | ↑ |
| ▸Japan | 1 | decision | 74 | 35 | 65 | 62 | 30 | 45 | 54.1 | ↑ |
| ▸California | 1 | frame, decision | 72 | 12 | 62 | 58 | 58 | 82 | 53.8 | ↑ |
| ▸Alibaba | 1 | decision | 72 | 45 | 35 | 58 | 70 | 60 | 53.3 | ↑ |
| ▸India | 1 | decision | 68 | 30 | 62 | 48 | 55 | 60 | 53.0 | ↑ |
| ▸Singapore Government | 1 | decision | 82 | 25 | 70 | 45 | 50 | 35 | 53.0 | ↑ |
| ▸Huawei+SMIC+CXMT complex | 1 | chokepoint, decision | 72 | 55 | 30 | 62 | 45 | 62 | 52.6 | ↑ |
| ▸Manufacturing/robotics | 2 | decision, flow | 68 | 40 | 45 | 60 | 55 | 50 | 51.8 | ↑ |
| ▸SoftBank — Masa Son | 1 | decision | 82 | 40 | 40 | 48 | 60 | 35 | 50.3 | ↑ |
| ▸DeepSeek — Liang Wenfeng | 1 | decision | 55 | 42 | 30 | 60 | 78 | 68 | 50.2 | ↑ |
| ▸ASML | 1 | chokepoint | 62 | 10 | 55 | 97 | 30 | 55 | 50.2 | ↑ |
| ▸Non-Nvidia silicon | 2 | chokepoint, decision | 70 | 65 | 12 | 55 | 50 | 62 | 49.4 | ↑ |
| ▸Embodied AI / robotics complex | 2 | decision, chokepoint | 65 | 45 | 30 | 60 | 55 | 58 | 49.4 | ↑ |
| ▸BlackRock + index bloc | 1 | decision, chokepoint | 93 | 10 | 42 | 68 | 58 | 25 | 47.9 | ↑ |
| ▸Finance | 2 | decision, flow | 78 | 8 | 52 | 62 | 50 | 45 | 47.6 | ↑ |
| ▸Transport/autonomy | 2 | decision, flow | 55 | 30 | 50 | 55 | 50 | 45 | 46.8 | ↑ |
| ▸Energy | 2 | decision, flow | 70 | 8 | 55 | 72 | 45 | 20 | 45.4 | → |
| ▸UK | 1 | frame, decision | 58 | 20 | 58 | 40 | 48 | 50 | 45.1 | → |
| ▸Telecom/satellites | 2 | decision, flow | 62 | 25 | 50 | 68 | 30 | 20 | 44.4 | ↑ |
| ▸Mistral+France axis | 2 | decision | 55 | 40 | 42 | 25 | 48 | 55 | 43.2 | ↑ |
| ▸Private credit complex — Apollo/Blackstone/KKR | 1 | decision | 84 | 10 | 40 | 55 | 55 | 20 | 43.1 | ↑ |
| ▸Entertainment/media | 2 | decision, flow | 60 | 8 | 45 | 55 | 55 | 55 | 43.1 | ↓ |
| ▸Construction/real estate | 2 | decision, flow | 65 | 5 | 45 | 65 | 50 | 40 | 42.8 | → |
| ▸a16z — Andreessen + VC complex | 1 | decision, frame | 72 | 8 | 42 | 45 | 62 | 45 | 42.7 | ↑ |
| ▸Healthcare/pharma | 2 | decision, flow | 68 | 10 | 50 | 58 | 25 | 40 | 42.1 | ↑ |
| ▸Academia + talent pipeline | 2 | flow, frame | 40 | 25 | 45 | 55 | 20 | 72 | 41.4 | ↓ |
| ▸Professional services & BPO | 2 | decision, flow | 60 | 10 | 45 | 40 | 45 | 55 | 40.2 | ↓ |
| ▸US Congress | 2 | decision, frame | 40 | 5 | 68 | 55 | 50 | 10 | 39.5 | → |
| ▸Israel | 2 | decision | 45 | 8 | 38 | 55 | 50 | 68 | 39.4 | ↑ |
| ▸Scientists/researchers | flow | 40 | 25 | 40 | 30 | 50 | 68 | 39.0 | ↓ | |
| ▸Grid operators/regulators | 2 | chokepoint, frame | 15 | 8 | 62 | 78 | 40 | 20 | 37.7 | ↑ |
| ▸Frontier-eval complex | 2 | frame | 8 | 15 | 55 | 50 | 60 | 55 | 37.5 | ↑ |
| ▸Neoclouds | 2 | decision | 55 | 62 | 8 | 45 | 35 | 15 | 37.3 | ↑ |
| ▸Courts + the copyright/liability docket | 2 | decision | 30 | 5 | 60 | 62 | 55 | 10 | 37.3 | ↑ |
| ▸Lab governance layer | 2 | frame, decision | 45 | 8 | 58 | 25 | 45 | 40 | 36.6 | → |
| ▸Retail/agentic commerce | 2 | decision, flow | 60 | 10 | 20 | 58 | 55 | 40 | 36.2 | ↑ |
| ▸Attention platforms | 2 | frame, chokepoint | 40 | 8 | 20 | 72 | 92 | 15 | 35.5 | ↑ |
| ▸Capital owners/ultra-wealthy | flow | 88 | 5 | 45 | 12 | 45 | 10 | 35.5 | ↑ | |
| ▸Grid-equipment oligopoly | 2 | chokepoint | 62 | 8 | 15 | 88 | 25 | 30 | 35.4 | ↑ |
| ▸Agent-economy rails | 2 | frame, chokepoint | 50 | 8 | 40 | 68 | 25 | 15 | 35.0 | ↑ |
| ▸Insurance/actuarial system | 2 | frame | 45 | 8 | 50 | 60 | 20 | 15 | 34.9 | ↑ |
| ▸Standards/safety institutes | 2 | frame | 8 | 20 | 52 | 45 | 50 | 40 | 34.6 | → |
| ▸Hugging Face + open-weights ecosystem | 2 | frame, chokepoint | 40 | 10 | 30 | 68 | 55 | 20 | 34.6 | ↑ |
| ▸Russia/Putin | 2 | decision | 35 | 8 | 55 | 40 | 45 | 20 | 34.3 | ↓ |
| ▸Organized labor/unions | 2 | decision | 15 | 5 | 50 | 55 | 55 | 40 | 34.0 | ↑ |
| ▸Data foundries | 2 | chokepoint | 55 | 10 | 12 | 65 | 25 | 62 | 33.5 | ↑ |
| ▸Education & credentialing | 2 | decision, flow | 35 | 8 | 40 | 45 | 45 | 40 | 33.3 | ↓ |
| ▸Skilled trades/physical workers | flow | 35 | 5 | 30 | 55 | 40 | 55 | 32.6 | ↑ | |
| ▸Global South populations | flow | 45 | 8 | 25 | 45 | 45 | 45 | 31.9 | → | |
| ▸DPRK+Iran | 2 | decision | 30 | 5 | 45 | 50 | 30 | 25 | 30.8 | → |
| ▸Criminal/adversarial ecosystem | 2 | decision | 45 | 35 | 8 | 45 | 20 | 30 | 29.6 | ↑ |
| ▸Open-source developers | flow | 30 | 8 | 20 | 40 | 55 | 55 | 29.2 | → | |
| ▸Ideological movements | 2 | flow, frame | 30 | 5 | 40 | 15 | 60 | 40 | 28.8 | ↑ |
| ▸Elderly/retirees | flow | 40 | 5 | 50 | 25 | 25 | 8 | 27.8 | → | |
| ▸Salaried knowledge workers | flow | 30 | 8 | 18 | 22 | 52 | 70 | 27.2 | ↓ | |
| ▸Creators/influencers | flow | 45 | 5 | 12 | 30 | 60 | 35 | 26.2 | ↑ | |
| ▸Founders/entrepreneurs | flow | 45 | 8 | 12 | 15 | 45 | 55 | 25.1 | ↑ | |
| ▸Religion/meaning-making | 2 | frame | 15 | 5 | 40 | 10 | 55 | 10 | 21.8 | ↑ |
| ▸Self-employed/gig | flow | 30 | 8 | 20 | 15 | 25 | 45 | 21.4 | ↓ | |
| ▸Digital natives (Gen Z/Alpha) | flow | 8 | 5 | 25 | 12 | 62 | 40 | 20.8 | ↑ | |
| ▸Students & new grads | flow | 15 | 5 | 18 | 15 | 45 | 45 | 19.6 | ↓ | |
| ▸International bodies | 2 | frame | 10 | 5 | 30 | 10 | 50 | 15 | 18.4 | ↓ |
Watchlist & field nodes — not yet power-scored
Power model
evidence-card scoring over 82 profiled nodes, registry-normalized 0-100 per dimension, fixed blend — 83 nodes scored, as of 2026-07.
Kept the task's ASI-transition blend (authority .25, compute .22, capital .18, chokepoint .15, attention .10, talent .10). It is consistent with engine-rules-v6 Step C (feasibility-weighting by power) and the v0 doctrine that legal coercion + the physical compute substrate are the binding constraints of the transition. Only change vs the v0 pilot: compute raised .20->.22 and chokepoint lowered .20->.15, because across the 82-card corpus compute-capacity control (owned fleets, custom silicon, contracted GW) proved more discriminating and less double-counted than chokepoint, which overlaps heavily with authority for sovereign nodes and with compute for silicon nodes. Same weights applied to every node so relative power stays comparable.
Pairwise sanity checks (23)
Is Alphabet (92) really above Microsoft (85) on compute?
Yes. Alphabet runs a 7-generation in-house TPU fleet and is supplying up to 1M TPUs to Anthropic — vertically self-sufficient silicon. Microsoft's Maia is nascent and it leans on Nvidia. Alphabet's owned frontier-compute capacity is deeper.
Should ASML (97) outrank TSMC (96) on chokepoint?
Held ASML marginally higher. ASML is a literal monopoly-of-one on EUV and sits upstream of TSMC; TSMC is the sole leading-edge fab but is itself ASML-dependent. ASML's substitution set is empty, TSMC's is merely near-empty.
Is Nvidia's chokepoint above or below TSMC's?adjusted
Lowered Nvidia 97->95, just below TSMC (96) and ASML (97). Nvidia's CUDA+allocation power is immense but it sits downstream of both — it cannot make a chip without TSMC or an EUV tool without ASML. Ordinal fab>Nvidia is now explicit.
Is us-natsec (90) correctly below us-president (100) on authority?
Yes. The president sits atop the natsec/export-control apparatus and can direct or override it (and appoints its principals). Its authority strictly dominates; 90 vs 100 preserves the ordering while crediting BIS/OFAC's durable career agenda-setting power.
Should China's composite (78.5) sit above the US President's (71.7)?
Kept China #1. It is the only node scoring strongly on ALL of authority(97)/capital(92)/compute(45)/chokepoint(88)/talent(72); the President is supreme on authority(100)+attention but owns ~0 compute(12) and Congress-gates capital. Under a blend that puts .22 on compute and .18 on capital, breadth beats a single 100. This is the model's most consequential and most contestable call — a chokepoint-heavy blend would flip it back to the President. Flagged, not adjusted.
Does Altman lead Amodei on every dimension?
Yes across the board — capital 85>76, compute 88>78, authority 38>30, chokepoint 62>58, attention 92>72, talent 84>82. Anthropic's revenue is growing faster but every absolute stock (valuation, contracted GW, distribution reach, mindshare) is smaller. Composite 71.1 vs 62.4.
Is BlackRock (93) rightly above private-credit (84) on capital?
Kept BlackRock higher on magnitude ($14T AUM dwarfs ~$1.1T credit AUM), but noted private-credit's money is the more AI-load-bearing — it directly underwrites the datacenter buildout ($27B Meta/Blue Owl JV) whereas most BlackRock AUM is passive index float. Magnitude wins the dimension; deployability is captured in their similar mid composites.
EU (74) vs California (62) on authority over AI?
EU kept higher on general/binding authority — a hard extraterritorial statute stack (AI Act, GDPR, DMA) over 450M. California's is market-forced (SB-53 as de-facto baseline) and more narrowly targeted at the labs' home jurisdiction. On AI specifically CA is close, but EU's binding breadth wins the dimension.
Do the firms (82) outrank the SK state (72) on the memory chokepoint?
Yes — the HBM/DRAM chokepoint is physically held by Samsung/SK Hynix; the state only exercises it derivatively (fast-tracking clusters, VEU exposure). Same firm>state logic applied to TSMC(96)>Taiwan(78).
Nvidia (72.4) vs Altman (71.1) — is the near-tie defensible?
Yes. Nvidia wins on chokepoint(95 vs 62) and capital(92 vs 85); Altman wins on compute(88 vs 75) and attention(92 vs 88). The ~1.3pt gap honestly reflects two different power shapes (bottleneck-holder vs demand-aggregator); not forcing a wider gap.
Fed (78) above Congress (68) on authority?
Kept Fed higher on exercisable authority — it acts unilaterally and markets move in seconds, whereas Congress's supreme Article I power is gridlocked on AI. Congress can structurally override the Fed, but on realized capacity-to-compel-outcomes in-window the Fed ranks higher.
SoftBank (82) vs a16z (72) on capital?
SoftBank higher — its capital is concentrated and deployed into the AI frontier ($64.6B OpenAI + $40B bridge + Stargate lead) versus a16z's larger-count but earlier-stage $90B AUM. Directed-into-frontier beats diversified-AUM here.
Aggregate platforms (92) above single ByteDance (88)?
Yes — the platforms node aggregates X+YouTube+TikTok+Reddit+Spotify (the majority of the connected world's attention surface), a strictly larger reach than ByteDance's 1.9B alone, though ByteDance is the single largest constituent.
Should the defense sector (56.5) sit below us-natsec (62.5)?
Yes. They share the security domain but us-natsec holds the coercive levers (authority 90, chokepoint 96 export gate) the sector must operate inside; the sector's edge is capital/talent breadth. Natsec above is correct.
Grid-equipment (88) far above neoclouds (45) on chokepoint?
Yes. Turbine/transformer supply is a hard physical rate-limiter with 4-year lead times and deliberately capped capacity — no datacenter proceeds without it. Neoclouds' 'chokepoint' is borrowed (Nvidia allocation + MS/OpenAI contracts) and debt-fragile. The wide gap is intended.
Alibaba (45) above DeepSeek (42) on compute?
Yes, narrowly — Alibaba has larger cloud capex and the T-Head PPU program; DeepSeek is compute-efficient off a ~10k-A100 base. Close because DeepSeek's efficiency partly offsets Alibaba's scale.
Ultra-wealthy (88) vs UAE (90) on capital?adjusted
UAE kept marginally higher despite a smaller headline number, because its capital is coordinated and directed (ADIA+MGX deploying into frontier labs as one strategy) whereas the $20T ultra-wealthy aggregate is diffuse and uncoordinated. Coordination breaks the tie.
Taiwan (70) vs South Korea (65) on talent?
Taiwan marginally higher — the TSMC fab-engineering pipeline is the single hardest-to-replicate workforce in the stack (Arizona/Kumamoto/Dresden ramps all slowed on skills). Korea's memory-process talent is comparably deep but a step less singular. Kept close.
Is Meta (82/93) rightly below Alphabet (92/98) on compute and capital?
Yes on both. Alphabet runs a seven-generation deployed TPU fleet and supplies up to 1M TPUs to Anthropic — vertically self-sufficient silicon — while Meta's 5GW Hyperion is planned capacity on Nvidia chips with MTIA still Broadcom-co-designed and nascent. On capital, Alphabet's ~$4.4T base and $180-190B capex exceed Meta's ~$125-145B capex on a much smaller market cap.
Meta (82/93) vs Microsoft (85/96) — is the gap defensible?
Yes, narrowly. Microsoft's Azure footprint is deployed across 60+ regions with Maia/Cobalt shipping and a $250B OpenAI purchase lock-in; Meta's headline gigawatts are mostly under construction (Prometheus ~1GW live, Hyperion 5GW planned). Capital 96 vs 93 mirrors the market-cap and capex-guidance gap. Meta's self-funding (98% ad revenue) keeps it close.
Does Altman (84/92) really hold talent and attention over Meta (83/85)?
Yes, by a hair on talent: Meta is the most aggressive buyer ($100M+ signing bonuses, ~14 frontier researchers, five Thinking Machines founders) but bought loyalty is unproven and one researcher rejected up to $1.5B, while OpenAI demonstrated near-total organic loyalty (the Nov 2023 revolt) — and Meta's frontier-model parity is still unproven. On attention, Meta owns the largest ad-supported audience (85) but the audience belongs to the apps; Altman personally sets the industry news cycle (92).
Should Meta (72.5) outrank the Musk complex (70.1)?
Yes. Meta wins on compute (82 vs 72 — the Hyperion/Prometheus buildout dwarfs Colossus) and capital (93 vs 86, self-funded vs margin-loan-dependent); Musk wins on authority (52 vs 44, having held actual federal executive power) and attention (90 vs 85). Under the compute+capital-weighted blend Meta edges ahead — a defensible ordering of two different power shapes.
Meta (72.5) lands marginally above Nvidia (72.1) — is that acceptable?
Accepted as a near-tie, flagged as contestable. Nvidia dominates on chokepoint (95 vs 66) and capital (92 vs 93 is a wash); Meta wins on authority (44 vs 32 — supervoting control plus a courtroom-validated monopoly position vs a merely deferential board) and operated compute (82 vs 75, Nvidia runs no hyperscale datacenters). With chokepoint at only .15 weight, the 0.4pt inversion follows from the blend; a chokepoint-heavier blend would restore Nvidia above Meta. No rescale of others forced.
Forecast evolution
The engine that produced this forecast has already revised itself seven times — v1-v6 rewrote the prediction rules after each backtest window; v7 expanded coverage from the 5 pilots to all 83 profiled nodes.
Cross-node dynamics
Horizon shown: H2 2026 → 2027.
- US-China chokepoint depreciation race (uspres-rf1 x china-rf1/rf4 x usnatsec-rf2/rf6 x hw-rf1): the escalation-truce cycle keeps running — next iteration trigger-anchored to the ~Oct/Nov 2026 rare-earth truce expiry, the truce priced FRAYING (the May 2026 Beijing summit bought agriculture with no rare-earth commitment; the Busan contrarian's closest-ever near-miss is promoted to a rising-tail watch item) — but BOTH levers depreciate with use even as BOTH ratchets run DENSER each cycle (rc-2024-4): chip controls accelerate Chinese substitution (the 2026-01 MIIT boycott order completed jensen-rf1's structural zero; Huawei's ~50% domestic share is the depreciation made visible), mineral controls accelerate Western reshoring. The v7 addition from the newly profiled us-natsec node: the ratchet now has a CASH REGISTER — usnatsec-rf4 converts each control rung into tolls and equity stakes, and usnatsec-rf6's negative space guarantees the total-denial line is never held, so the race's terminal state is managed, monetized interdependence, not decoupling.
- State-capital fusion of the US AI stack — the gate is now an INSTITUTION, not an event: altman-rf2/rf7 x uspres-rf8 x usnatsec-rf4/rf7 x ssi-rf3 x jensen-rf8. The GPT-5.6 hold-and-clear cycle (Jun-Jul 2026) plus the Sol-variant cyber-capability hold give the security-review gate its first exercised instances, CAISI is the standing operator, and the sovereign-fund equity proposal (2026-07, ~5% of OpenAI) is the first formal equity instrument on the table; the chip side already runs on revenue-share tolls and the Intel stake. the bespoke deal terms least likely; the tolls in between. LL-2026H2-23 is this dynamic's live test.
- The compute-buildout debt cycle (oracle-stargate x neoclouds x private-credit-complex x softbank x sector-finance x us-federal-reserve) — NEW in v7, the horizon's largest financial-stability dynamic: OpenAI's compute commitments flow into Oracle's $300B contract and the neoclouds' contract-collateralized debt (CoreWeave's ladder), which private credit holds and banks underwrite, while SoftBank levers the equity layer ($64.6B stake + $40B bridge) and Nvidia backstops the neocloud middle (~$6.3B unsold-capacity commitment). Coverage ratios are deteriorating in Fed research (3.1x -> 1.6x), the Oracle CDS blowout (2026-02, spread tripled) is the first market-priced stress event, GPU depreciation schedules are publicly flagged as understated (~$176B), and the Fed's fed-rf7 negative space says it will NAME the exposure without ACTING on it. RF-collision logic: privatecredit-rf5 (never concede systemic risk) x neocloud-rf5 (never shorten depreciation) x oraclestargate-rf2 (reaffirm-and-refinance) form a mutually-reinforcing denial lattice that holds until a demand disappointment at the OpenAI layer tests it; fed-rf1's market-put is the designated circuit breaker. Named early-warning indicators, in order: the Oracle CDS spread, a neocloud depreciation restatement, a flagship perpetual-vehicle gate deployment, an ASML/TSMC order-book inflection.
- The state-security-review gate as a standing institution (us-natsec-export-control-state x standards-safety-institutes x lab-governance-layer x altman-openai x amodei-anthropic x frontier-eval-complex): rc-2026H1-4's mechanism now has a full institutional stack — CAISI operates the reviews using frontier-eval-complex methodology (fec-rf1's capability clock becomes the trigger metric), usnatsec-rf7 extends the chokepoint from chips into model weights, and lgl-rf5 shows lab release cadence bending to it while internal governance (LTBT, boards) stays hollow. The gate has held and cleared, never yet cancelled or rolled back — that distinction is load-bearing in every negative-space no-pause claim (LL-2026H2-08 carries it). The collision to watch: a gate exercise against ANTHROPIC (whose amodei-rf6 negative space predicts no self-imposed pause) would test whether the accommodate-the-sovereign pattern generalizes beyond OpenAI; a gate ending in CANCELLATION is the class's regime break and an immediate re-emission trigger.
- Circular-financing correlation, now four-layered (jensen-rf3 x altman-rf4/rf9 x neocloud-rf2 x softbank-rf2 x nonnvidia-rf3): Nvidia equity funds OpenAI's silicon purchases ($30B closed 2026-02, $30B more in the $110B round), AMD pays for OpenAI demand in warrants (~10% of the company), Nvidia backstops CoreWeave's unsold capacity, SoftBank bridges the equity gaps, and the $110B round (Amazon $50B + SoftBank $30B + Nvidia $30B at $840B post) closed the loop at record scale. The strongest private nodes have deliberately correlated their balance sheets. Band forms split per rc-2026H1-1: monotone legs (usage, revenue, round ladder) keep open-upper bands; reversible legs (Nvidia market cap; OpenAI's the day it lists) carry haircut lower edges with the down-leg twice-demonstrated. The correlated upside is unbounded in-band; the correlated markdown is priced, observed behavior.
- The white-collar shock chain (labs' agentic capability x sector-professional-services x sector-finance x amazon/microsoft execution x salaried-knowledge-workers x students-new-grads x us-congress x us-president) — expanded in v7 with its full transmission path: capability release -> enterprise adoption (50%+ of firms) -> junior-first substitution (Big-Four intakes -6-29%, bank analyst classes cut two-thirds, McKinsey's largest-since-2008 cuts) -> the workers node absorbs (29+ months of contraction, 100K+ AI-cited layoffs in H1-2026 alone) -> students shelter in debt-financed credentialing (LSAC +33%) -> NO union or collective response (workers-rf9, labor-rf5, students-rf5, sci-rf6 — Congress's role is confirmatory: congress-rf2 blocks comprehensive frameworks, so the response arrives as a reconciliation-class fiscal program, not conduct regulation. The apprenticeship-pyramid break (juniors never trained) is the chain's slow-burning structural payload —
- The open-weights front realigned by Meta's defection (zuck-rf2 REVERSAL x ds-rf1 x ali-rf1 x hf-rf1/rf6 x china-rf7): Meta's closed turn (Muse Spark, 2026-04) removed the US anchor of the open ecosystem, handing the open-weights front to the China track — DeepSeek (research-grade openness on the founder's bar) and Alibaba's Qwen (distribution-grade: 700M+ downloads, past Llama as the most-downloaded family) now define it, with Hugging Face the neutral-but-China-weighted distribution artery (hf-rf6 keeps hosting without geo-fencing). Consequence chain: US open-weights leadership now depends on second-tier players and the one-off gpt-oss class, the commoditization pressure on US closed labs comes almost entirely from Beijing-aligned releases (feeding altman-rf9's burn and the fusion dynamic's state-cover price), and a US policy action against Chinese open-weights distribution — previously unthinkable — becomes a live option in any 2027-28 hawkish turn. LL-2026H2-20/24/25 test all three legs.
- Taiwan-strait as the system's binding tail (tsmc-rf5/rf6/rf8 x taiwan-rf1/rf8 x china-rf5/rf10 x uspres-rf9 x samsung/korea contingency): the kinetic tail stays in the shock budget, but the SHAPE of the deterrence is now fully priced across four nodes — TSMC keeps the leading edge in Taiwan BY CHOICE (the shield is its siting policy), Taiwan trades thin slivers for US lock-in while its legislature cuts the defense budget 40% below the executive ask, China's drills gain specificity each cycle without crossing (rf10 restraint held every cycle), and uspres-rf9's anti-decoupling restraint holds unless a Taiwan kinetic event or a smuggled-compute capability shock flips it to embargo. RF-collision logic: every actor's dominant strategy is to keep the ambiguity — the dynamic's stability is real but it rests on three restraint patterns (china-rf10, taiwan-rf8, uspres-rf9) that have never been tested simultaneously.
- The grid rate-limiter (grid-equipment-oligopoly x grid-operators-regulators x sector-energy x sector-construction x microsoft/hyperscalers) — NEW in v7 as a first-class dynamic: the physical ceiling on the entire buildout is set by four stacked constraints — Microsoft naming an ~$80B unfulfillable AI backlog on power constraints is the demand side made explicit. so the rate-limiter binds harder each year, capacity auctions clear at caps, and ratepayer politics (13-governor class, 2026-28 cycles) becomes the buildout's largest domestic political exposure outside displacement itself. A greenfield mega-plant wave (LL-2026H2-28's refutation) is the single clearest signal the constraint is breaking.
- The HBM/memory pacing constraint (samsung-sk-hynix x south-korea x huawei-smic-cxmt x jensen/nvidia x tsmc) — NEW in v7: memory paces BOTH blocs' accelerator roadmaps. West: every Nvidia/AMD/Broadcom-class part queues at the Samsung/Hynix/Micron HBM4 qualification gates (samhbm-rf1), giving Seoul alliance-bargaining currency (korea-rf4) and making Korean capacity discipline (samhbm-rf3/rf8) a quiet co-governor of accelerator supply. East: CXMT's HBM output caps Huawei's Ascend volume at 250-300K 910C-equivalents against 600K targets — the single binding constraint on China's compute self-sufficiency, worth more than any single export rule. RF-collision logic: a Chinese HBM3-class breakthrough at CXMT would relieve China's cap AND crash the scarcity pricing the Korean duopoly's discipline maintains — the one event that moves both blocs' compute curves at once;
- Gulf compute-for-alignment trade (uae-rf1/rf4 x mbs-rf3/rf5 x uspres-rf8 x jensen-rf8 x altman/amodei raise cadence): the Gulf sovereigns convert hydrocarbon capital into US-conditioned compute and cross-lab equity — UAE executes (Stargate UAE phases, the ~$49B MGX fund, stakes in OpenAI+xAI+Anthropic simultaneously), Saudi announces bigger and delivers slower (mbs-rf5's announcement-layer vs Humain's real 100MW-class delivery layer), and both bought in via personally-channeled access to the administration (the World Liberty Financial entanglement is now publicly exposed). RF-collision logic: the trade is triple-conditioned — making Gulf compute the single most politically-contingent tranche of global capacity;
- The embodiment wave's supply-demand geography (china-rf6 x robotics-complex x sector-manufacturing x japan-rf6 x korea demographics x amazon-rf3 x musk/Optimus) — DEMAND concentrates where demographics force it — Japan (japan-rf6: robots INSTEAD of immigration, the ¥500bn Physical-AI strategy) and Korea (world's highest robot density, Population Ministry) are the US-bloc's structural early adopters. RF-collision logic: US export controls extending to Chinese humanoids (the DJI precedent, roboticscx-rf6's negative space still holding) is the policy fork that would split the wave into two hardware ecosystems exactly as chips split;
- The discontinuity cadence as a system clock (rc-2022-4, verified): roughly one ChatGPT-magnitude mass-adoption or capability-salience discontinuity per ~2 years (GPT-3 2020, ChatGPT 2022, DeepSeek R1 2025), sourced from the US closed-lab track (consumer-agentic mainstream crossing by end-2027; the io device ~2027-28), the China open-weights track (a second R1-magnitude shock is base-rate-expected), or — new in v7 — Each event moves the whole board: deepens state-capital fusion (a discontinuity-scale release is the likeliest next gate trigger), step-functions worker adoption AND displacement, delivers Nvidia a demand surge or an absorbed efficiency scare, and — if China-origin — arms uspres-rf9's embargo flip. Magnitude bands asymmetric on monotone metrics only (rc-2025-1/rc-2026H1-1). Plan the horizon around 1-2 such events; every node read degrades gracefully to its directional call if a specific event is mistimed.
- The governance-rupture cadence as a second system clock (rc-2023-3, verified both directions across four windows) — now priced across 83 nodes: internal instability is a recurring class with forecastable frequency and un-forecastable specifics. The stable floors that keep the enumeration honest: Nvidia (thrice-validated 0.15), TSMC (rf7 pre-announced transitions), Singapore (sg-rf8 stage-managed succession), Korea (korea-rf5 — ruptures resolve THROUGH institutions). The three sovereign apex tails (Xi succession, MBS kingship, Tahnoun concentration) remain unmodelable and outside the table. ALL clocks are annual-rate constructs: Poisson-scaled per rc-2026H1-2 in every sub-annual window — quarterly silence is expected behavior, a zero-event YEAR is the break signal.
Live ledger
MANDATORY FRAMING (rc-2026H1-6): the pooled five-window backtest (2021-2025) is METHOD CALIBRATION — the predictor's training overlaps those windows, so backtest scores validate the machinery, not out-of-sample skill. The 2026H1 window was a knowledge-horizon SMOKE TEST (rc-2025-5): its mechanics findings inform this file's structural rules but its outcomes never entered the pooled record and re-fit no confidence value. The liveLedger below is the ONLY true out-of-sample test: every claim postdates the Jan-2026 training cutoff, is frozen once posted, and will be publicly scored. The first genuinely-blind scored window in this framework's history is 2026H2. Coverage bound (v7): the five-node pilot bound is RESOLVED — this file prices all 83 profiled registry nodes (33 Tier-1 full treatment; 39 Tier-2 and 11 flow-population nodes compact), on the same frozen engine (engine-rules-v6) and power-scores-v1; the residual unpriced surface is the registry's unprofiled remainder and genuinely novel mechanisms. The 15 v6 liveLedger claims are carried byte-identical and remain frozen for blind scoring; the 18 v7-appended claims (addedIn:v7) freeze on posting and extend the same out-of-sample ledger. 15 frozen claims + 19 added in v7.
| ID | Claim | Confidence | Score by | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LL-2026H2-01 | The US executes >=1 new AI/chip control action in H2 2026 — a new BIS rule or licensing change, an Entity List addition naming AI/semiconductor targets, or an expansion/extension of the monetized carve-out class (H20-pattern revenue-share licensing). | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-02 | >=1 domestic political-violence or civil-disorder shock — an assassination or attempt, a mass-casualty political attack, a record-length institutional breakdown, or a domestic military/Guard deployment against civil unrest — materially disturbs the us-president node in H2 2026. No target, date, or mechanism named. | 60% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-03 | >=1 additional unexplained senior Chinese official removal (ministerial, PLA-command, or Politburo level) becomes publicly evident in H2 2026, without official explanation beyond discipline-violation boilerplate. | 58% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-04 | China formally allocates or disburses >=1 further tranche of 15th-FYP AI/robotics capital in H2 2026 — a named RMB1tn-fund tranche, a new Big Fund III fab commitment, or a new provincial/city embodiment fund at >=RMB10bn scale. | 90% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-05 | China does NOT launch a national-scale household cash-transfer or consumption-voucher program (a china-rf2-shaped demand-side reversal) in H2 2026; stimulus stays investment/supply-side. Suppressive statistical relief (suspending/redefining a livelihood series) does not refute this claim and is tracked separately as a pressure-valve confirmation. | 92% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-06 | OpenAI logs >=1 further formal IPO-track process milestone in H2 2026 that becomes publicly evidenced by Dec 31 — an underwriter mandate, a confidential draft/S-1-track filing, a board listing authorization, or an announced listing timetable. | 80% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-07 | ChatGPT-class weekly active users reach >=1B on the primary reported WAU series by Dec 31 2026 (from ~900M mid-2026). Scored on the lower edge; upper edge open. | 85% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-08 | OpenAI ships >=1 major model or product release in H2 2026, and NO state action — security-review gate (the rc-2026H1-4 channel, explicitly enumerated), AG oversight, or EU regulatory pressure — CANCELS a planned flagship release or forces a rollback of a deployed model; a temporary hold that resolves to clearance within ~60 days confirms rather than refutes. | 92% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-09 | Nvidia announces NO list-price cut on datacenter GPUs, NO reduction in datacenter guidance attributed to demand weakness, and holds its architecture cadence (Rubin ramp milestones on schedule) through both H2 2026 earnings prints; evasive-form concessions (mix-shift discounting, bundle restructuring, softened order-book language) refute if the dominant pattern reads as an effective price concession. | 92% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-10 | Nvidia closes at a new all-time-high market capitalization — above its 2025 $5T-class peak — on at least one trading day in H2 2026. | 72% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-11 | Nvidia announces >=1 NEW >=$1B strategic-equity or moat-absorbing deal (a new stake, acquisition, or absorb-the-rival arrangement — execution of previously announced deals does not count) in H2 2026. | 40% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-12 | AI-attributed layoffs by the Challenger AI-cited class total >=100K in H2 2026 (matching or exceeding the H1-2026 pace, putting full-year 2026 at roughly double 2025). | 75% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-13 | No mass mobilization: no new certified union win or NLRB election victory at a US frontier AI lab or top-10 US tech employer in H2 2026, and NLRB FY2026 petition counts do not exceed the FY2024 peak (3,286); the existing DeepMind-London CWU chapter and 0-1 further small breakout chapters do not refute. | 92% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-14 | The US-China rare-earth truce reaching its ~Oct/Nov 2026 expiry resolves ACTIVELY: either a formal renewal/extension-for-relief, OR a new export-control/minerals action by at least one side within 6 weeks of expiry. A silent lapse with no action from either side by Dec 31 refutes. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-15 | >=1 NEW multi-billion-dollar equity-for-compute, supplier-equity, or state-equity arrangement inside the US AI stack is announced in H2 2026 — any pairing among {OpenAI, Nvidia, AMD, Broadcom, a hyperscaler, the US government/a sovereign fund} counts; execution of pre-H2 deals does not. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-16v7 | Anthropic ships >=2 major frontier model releases (a new model family, tier, or major version — point updates below 0.1-class do not count) in H2 2026. | 90% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-17v7 | Anthropic's reported run-rate revenue reaches >=$60B on the same reported series that printed $47B in May 2026, by Dec 31 2026. Scored on the lower edge; upper open. | 80% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-18v7 | Alphabet's calendar-2026 capex guidance is revised upward at least once during H2 2026 earnings communications, OR initial 2027 capex guidance is set above the final 2026 figure. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-19v7 | Microsoft announces >=1 further headcount-reduction round of >=1,000 roles in H2 2026 while its stated capex program holds or rises. | 75% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-20v7 | Meta does NOT release an open-weights frontier-class model in H2 2026; the closed turn (Muse Spark line) holds. Down-tier or utility-class open releases do not refute; a Llama-class open frontier release refutes. | 80% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-21v7 | TSMC's most-advanced production node (N2/A16 class) remains in volume production exclusively in Taiwan through Dec 31 2026 — no parity-node volume production begins, and no binding commitment to move the CURRENT leading edge abroad is announced. Trailing-node overseas expansion (Arizona 2nm-class fabs for FUTURE parity) does not refute. | 92% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-22v7 | US enforcement escalation continues: >=1 new DOJ criminal indictment or arrest, OR a record-setting BIS administrative penalty, tied to AI-chip smuggling/diversion, lands in H2 2026. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-23v7 | A SECOND distinct exercised pre-release security-review event — a review, hold, or vetted-partner restriction on a frontier model release by any US lab via the Commerce/CAISI channel, separate from the GPT-5.6 cycle — occurs in H2 2026. | 55% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-24v7 | DeepSeek ships >=1 new open-weight model release under a permissive license with a published technical report in H2 2026. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-25v7 | Alibaba ships >=1 new benchmark-competitive open-weights Qwen release (new family or major version) in H2 2026. | 90% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-26v7 | xAI closes >=1 new capital event in H2 2026 — a funding round, a valuation step-up via secondary/strategic investment, or an all-stock consolidation — at or above its prior mark. | 80% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-27v7 | >=2 NEW multi-billion-dollar (>= $5B headline) private-credit/infrastructure financings or JV commitments for AI datacenters/power are announced in H2 2026 by the private-capital bloc (Blackstone/Apollo/KKR/Blue Owl/Ares class, alone or with partners). Execution of pre-H2 deals does not count. | 60% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-28v7 | Gas-turbine capacity discipline holds: none of GE Vernova, Siemens Energy, or Mitsubishi Power announces a NEW greenfield gas-turbine manufacturing mega-plant in H2 2026; announced expansions stay incremental (existing-line/brownfield). A greenfield mega-plant announcement by any of the three refutes. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-29v7 | No US RTO/ISO or state government enacts a blanket ban or moratorium on NEW datacenter interconnections in H2 2026; the ratepayer politics channels into tariffs, fees, and study requirements instead. County/municipal-level actions do not refute. | 86% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-30v7 | Congress enacts NO comprehensive AI regulatory framework and NO federal preemption of state AI law in H2 2026 (the Great-American-AI-Act class stays at draft/hearing stage; any enacted preemption rider refutes). Narrow single-harm statutes (deepfake/CSAM class) do not refute. | 90% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-31v7 | NO fully AI-discovered drug candidate (AI-originated molecule, Isomorphic class) receives FDA marketing approval in H2 2026; the frontier remains trial entry/progression. | 92% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2026H2-32v7 | Waymo's reported weekly paid rides reach >=700,000 on its own reported series by Dec 31 2026 (from ~450K in Dec 2025 against a stated 1M end-2026 target). Scored on the lower edge; upper open. | 75% | 2026-12-31 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2027H1-01v7 | Unitree completes its STAR Market IPO (shares begin trading) by Jun 30 2027. | 80% | 2027-06-30 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |
| LL-2027H1-02v7 | The EU does NOT re-accelerate the deferred AI Act high-risk obligations, and no NEW binding EU obligation on foundation-model makers takes legal effect before Jun 30 2027 (the Digital-Omnibus deferral to Dec 2027 holds). | 90% | 2027-06-30 | open — scoring begins Q4 2026 |